書籍詳細

書籍詳細




洋書

顕示選好を超える意思決定理論

The Mind under the Axioms : Decision-Theory Beyond Revealed Preferences

(Perspectives in Behavioral Economics and the Economics of Behavior)

Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha

Academic Pr 2019/09
191 p. 22 cm   
装丁: Pap   
版表示など: pap.    装丁について
テキストの言語: ENG    出版国: US
ISBN: 9780128151310
KCN: 1034495992
紀伊國屋書店 選定タイトル
標準価格:¥22,110(本体 ¥20,100)   
Web販売価格あり    Web販売価格について

為替レートの変動や出版社の都合によって、価格が変動する場合がございます。

この商品は提携先の海外出版社在庫からの取り寄せとなります。品切れの場合、恐れ入りますがご了承下さい。

納期について
DDC: 330
KDC: E111 経済理論
C22 知覚・認知・神経・意識
関連書リスト: NB4565
ご購入を希望される方は、
下のリンクをクリックしてください。

Annotation

The book reviews two basic ingredients of our understanding of human decisions - conative aspects (preferences) and cognitive aspects (beliefs). It offers a bridge between the disciplines of decision-theory, psychology, and neuroeconomics.

Full Description

The Mind under the Axioms reviews two basic ingredients of our understanding of human decisions - conative aspects (preferences) and cognitive aspects (beliefs). These ingredients are axiomatized in modern decision theory in the view to obtain a formally and empirically tractable representation of the decision-maker. The main issue developed in this book is the connection between realistic and testable psychological features and the descriptive component of abstract axioms of rationality. It addresses three main topics for which the interaction between axiomatization and psychology leads to potential new developments in experimental decision-theory and puts strictures on the standard revealed preference methodology prevailing in that field. The possibility of a cardinal representation of preferences is discussed. Different ways of accounting for incomplete preferences, and in which sense, are analysed. Finally, the conditions of separability between preferences and beliefs, such as prescribed by axioms of state-independence, are submitted to actual and potential tests. The book offers a bridge between the disciplines of decision-theory, psychology, and neuroeconomics. It is thus relevant for those, in psychology and cognitive sciences, who are sometimes put off by the high degree of formalism and abstraction in decision-theory, that seems to lie beyond the reach of psychological realism. It also aims to convince those in decision-theory for whom psychological realism and empirical testability should not constrain the modelling enterprise that conceptual clarification can come from attempted experimentation.

Table of Contents

1. Cardinalism 2. Incompleteness 3. State-dependence 4. A Conclusive Remark: Decision Theory and the Transistion from the Unconscious to the Conscious