書籍詳細

書籍詳細




洋書

労働者管理企業:理論的根拠

The Labor-Managed Firm : Theoretical Foundations

Dow, Gregory K.

Cambridge Univ Pr 2018/04
413 p. 24 cm   
装丁: Hrd    装丁について
テキストの言語: ENG    出版国: GB
ISBN: 9781107132979
装丁違いISBN: 1107589657
KCN: 1028383113
紀伊國屋書店 選定タイトル
標準価格:¥19,855(本体 ¥18,050)   
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納期について
DDC: 338.69
KDC: E220 企業理論
E16 労働
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Annotation

New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 2018.

Full Description

This book uses economic theory to argue that worker-controlled firms are rare due to market failures rather than inherent organizational defects. The book will be of interest to scholarly researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in economics, especially in industrial organization, labor economics, comparative economics, organizational economics, and finance.
Detailed information

Table of Contents

Part I. Setting the Stage: 1. The puzzling asymmetry; Part II. Perfection and Symmetry: 2. Profit maximization and control rights; 3. The labor-managed firm in the short run; 4. The labor-managed firm in the long run; 5. The labor-managed firm in general equilibrium; Part III. Imperfection and Asymmetry: 6. Empirical asymmetries (I); 7. Empirical asymmetries (II); 8. The rarity of labor-managed firms; Part IV. Appropriation Problems: 9. Imperfect appropriation; 10. Firm formation with adverse selection; 11. Partnership markets with adverse selection; Part V. Public Good Problems: 12. Collective choice and investor takeovers; 13. Free riding and employee buyouts; Part VI. Opportunism Problems (I): 14. Transaction cost economics; 15. Firm-specific investments; Part VII. Opportunism Problems (II): 16. Asset ownership and work incentives; 17. Capital stocks and labor flows; 18. Honest and dishonest controllers; Part VIII. Synthesis and Agenda: 19. Breaking the symmetry; 20. Policy directions.