Moscow has progressively replaced geopolitics with geoeconomics as power is recognised to derive from the state’s ability to establish a privileged position in strategic markets and transportation corridors. The objective is to bridge the vast Eurasian continent to reposition Russia from the periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a new constellation. Moscow’s ‘Greater Europe’ ambition of the previous decades produced a failed Western-centric foreign policy culminating in excessive dependence on the West. Instead of constructing Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’, the ‘leaning-to-one-side’ approach deprived Russia of the market value and leverage needed to negotiate a more favourable and inclusive Europe. Eurasian integration offers Russia the opportunity to address this ‘overreliance’ on the West by using the Russia’s position as a Eurasian state to advance its influence in Europe.
Offering an account steeped in Russian economic statecraft and power politics, this book offers a rare glimpse into the dominant narratives of Russian strategic culture. It explains how the country’s outlook adjusts to the ongoing realignment towards Asia while engaging in a parallel assessment of Russia’s interactions with other significant actors. The author offers discussion both on Russian responses and adaptations to the current power transition and the ways in which the economic initiatives promoted by Moscow in its project for a ‘Greater Eurasia’ reflect the entrepreneurial foreign policy strategy of the country.
Table of Contents
Preface by Prof. Sergei Karaganov
1. Theorising Geoeconomic Strategy for Eurasian Integration
2. The Rise, Decline and Potential Revival of US Geoeconomic Power
3. Russian Failed Geoeconomic Strategy for a ‘Greater Europe’
4. Russian Geoeconomics in a Greater Eurasia
5. Chinese Geo-economics and the Silk Road Development Strategy
6. Russia and China: Convergence of the Eurasian Core
7. Strategic Diversity in Northeast Asia: Japan and Korea
8. Connectivity with Southern Eurasia
9. Europe at the Periphery of ‘Greater Eurasia’
Conclusion: Towards a New Russian Grand Strategy