This book offers a new account of what it is to act for a normative reason. The first part of the book introduces some popular ideas and problems concerning causal and dispositional approaches of acting for reasons. The author argues that the dispositional approach should take a certain form that unites epistemic, volitional, and executional dispositions in a complex normative competence. This "Normative Competence Account" allows for more and less reflective ways of acting for normative reasons. The second part of the book clarifies the relation between the normative reason that an agent acts for and his or her motivating reasons. The chapters in this part refute the widely held "identity view" that acting for a normative reason requires the normative reason to be identical with a motivating reason. The author describes how normative reasons are related to motivating reasons by a relation of correspondence, and proposes a new understanding of how normative reasons explain those actions that are performed for them. Determined by Reasons engages with current debates from a wide range of different philosophical areas, including action theory, metaethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and ontology, to develop a new account of normative reasons.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction Part I: Acting for a Normative Reason 2. The Causal Account and the Role of Dispositions 3. The Normative Competence Account 4. Two Ways of Acting for a Normative Reason 5. Conclusion of Part I Part II: Squaring Normative Reasons with Motivating Reasons 6. The Identity Thesis 7. Worldly Reasons in the Deliberative Realm 8. Worldly Reasons in the Explanatory Realm 9. Worldly Reasons and the Psychological Account of Action 10. Conclusion of Part II and General Reflections